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SUBPRIME EDUCATION: FOR-PROFIT
COLLEGES AND THE PROBLEM WITH TITLE
IV FEDERAL STUDENT AID
MATTHEW A. MCGUIRE†
ABSTRACT
Federal student-aid policy is designed with the goal of expanding
access to higher education for all students. It has been enormously
successful in achieving that goal. Yet, for many students, federal
student aid has served only to burden them with oppressive studentdebt obligations. These obligations are a particular problem with
respect to the for-profit higher-education sector, which receives a large
and ever-growing proportion of federal aid. This Note examines the
interaction between federal student-aid policy and for-profit
institutions, arguing that the noble goals of modern federal studentaid policy enable the very practices that lead to negative outcomes for
many students by creating a lucrative market for “subprime
education.” This Note analyzes a continuum of approaches to
reducing the negative student outcomes caused by many for-profit
institutions, concluding that the blame lies not with for-profit
institutions but with federal student-aid policy. Ultimately, the modern
federal student-aid regime requires regulators to choose between
abetting negative student outcomes and reducing access to higher
education. This dilemma can be avoided only by deemphasizing the
student-oriented aid model in favor of an institution-centered model
that is focused on reducing the price of education.

INTRODUCTION
1

Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) established
2
the foundation for federal student aid in higher education. The HEA
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rests upon the basic premise that every student, regardless of personal
wealth, should have the opportunity to pursue career training or a
3
degree. “[T]his Nation could never rest while the door to knowledge
remained closed to any American,” President Johnson said after
4
signing the bill.
Today, the United States continues to make a substantial
financial commitment to keeping the “door to knowledge” open for
all. During the 2009–10 academic year, the federal government
awarded $146.5 billion in grants and loans to students through Title
5
IV programs. Title IV funds go toward programs at every degree
level, to traditional and nontraditional students, and to students at
public, private nonprofit, and private for-profit colleges and
6
universities alike.
Indeed, a significant share of those funds has gone to students at
for-profit institutions. During the 2009-10 academic year, the forprofit sector received $32 billion in Title IV student aid—more than
7
20 percent of all federal aid. These institutions have been
instrumental in expanding access to higher education for populations
historically underserved by public and nonprofit institutions: adult
nontraditional students, students from disadvantaged economic
1. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, tit. IV, 79 Stat. 1232 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070 to 1099c-2, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2751–2756b (2006 &
Supp. IV 2011)).
2. E.g., Brian Pusser & David A. Wolcott, A Crowded Lobby: Nonprofit and For-Profit
Universities and the Emerging Politics of Higher Education, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING:
THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES 167, 170 (David W. Breneman, Brian Pusser & Sarah
E. Turner eds., 2006).
3. See S. REP. NO. 89-621, at 28 (1965) (“What is badly needed now is a comprehensive
program for financing the college costs of all who have a legitimate need.”).
4. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at Southwest Texas State College upon Signing
the Higher Education Act of 1965, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1102, 1105 (Nov. 8, 1965).
5. NAT’L ASS’N OF STUDENT FIN. AID ADM’RS, FEDERAL STUDENT FINANCIAL AID:
2011 NATIONAL PROFILE OF PROGRAMS IN TITLE IV OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT 2
(2011), available at http://www.nasfaa.org/EntrancePDF.aspx?id=5328.
6. See 20 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (defining eligible institutions). Institutions
within the for-profit higher-education sector have also been named, among other terms, “career
colleges” and “proprietary institutions.” E.g., Nicholas R. Johnson, Phoenix Rising: Default
Rates at Proprietary Institutions and What Can Be Done To Reduce Them, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 225
passim (2011); VA. CAREER COLL. ASS’N, http://www.va-cca.org (last visited Sept. 14, 2012).
This Note will use the term “for-profit” to distinguish these institutions from higher-education
providers that are organized as nonprofit institutions.
7. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-150, FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS:
EXPERIENCES OF UNDERCOVER STUDENTS ENROLLED IN ONLINE CLASSES AT SELECTED
COLLEGES 1 (2011) (reporting that the “for-profit colleges received almost $32 billion in grants
and loans” under Title IV); supra text accompanying note 5.

MCGUIRE IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/3/2012 1:49 PM

SUBPRIME EDUCATION

121
8

backgrounds, and members of minority groups. But for-profit
institutions are also strongly correlated with poor student outcomes.
Compared to similar students at nonprofit institutions, students at
for-profit institutions are more likely to fail to complete a degree,
carry more onerous student-debt loads upon graduation, and default
9
on student loans. Due in large part to these poor student outcomes,
many for-profit institutions frequently find themselves in the news,
10
characterized as unscrupulous or predatory, leading to questions
about the propriety of government support for some for-profit
institutions. In fact, federal aid constitutes nearly all of the revenue of
11
many of the most prominent for-profit institutions. Unfortunately,
current law incentivizes the practices of the for-profit sector that lead
to negative outcomes. Much like lenders in the subprime mortgage
market, for-profit institutions find themselves in a position to benefit
handsomely from the debt of marginally creditworthy borrowers
without bearing any accompanying risk.
This Note examines the interaction between the Title IV student
12
aid program and the for-profit higher-education industry.
Ultimately, Title IV’s portable-subsidy student-aid model lies at the
13
root of the problems associated with many for-profit institutions.
Regulators attempting to alleviate these problems under the Title IV
framework have an unsavory choice: tighten access to student aid
and, therefore, restrict educational opportunity, or continue to

8. See Osamudia R. James, Predatory Ed: The Conflict Between Public Good and ForProfit Higher Education, 38 J.C. & U.L. 45, 53 (2011) (noting that such student groups “choose
for-profit . . . education at disproportionate rates”); see also infra Part II.A.2.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. See, e.g., Andréa Ford, Going for Broke, TIME, May 9, 2011, at 44, 44 (noting that
“[a]necdote by anecdote, a firestorm has been building around for-profit education for some
time” and referring to for-profit education as “a predatory industry”); Peter S. Goodman, In
Hard Times, Lured into Trade School and Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at A1 (“Critics say
many schools exaggerate the value of their degree programs, selling young people on dreams of
middle-class wages while setting them up for default on untenable debts, low-wage work and a
struggle to avoid poverty.”); Frontline: College, Inc. (PBS television broadcast May 4, 2010),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/collegeinc (examining the controversy
surrounding for-profit educational institutions).
11. See infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text.
12. For an excellent recent discussion of the interaction between Title IV and for-profit
institutions, see generally James, supra note 8.
13. The portable-subsidy model seeks to expand access to education by granting funds to
students to use to defray education costs at their institution of choice. Brian Pusser, Higher
Education, Markets, and the Preservation of the Public Good, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING:
THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 2, at 23, 36.
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facilitate negative student outcomes. Instead, a reemphasis of the
15
public-supply model would allow government to avoid that dilemma.
Part I of this Note outlines the goals and structure of the current
regime for administering and regulating federal student aid. Part II
explores the rise of the for-profit education industry and the
consequences of its expansion. Part III analyzes the impact of the
current legal and regulatory student-aid regime on the for-profit
education industry, concluding that Title IV student aid enables the
negative outcomes associated with the industry and that the tools that
the Title IV regime provides to reduce the occurrence of these
outcomes are ineffective. Finally, Part IV examines a continuum of
possible approaches to solving the systemic issues introduced in Part
III. Ultimately, none of these approaches prove satisfying. This Note,
then, suggests looking outside of the Title IV portable-subsidy
framework for a solution.
I. TITLE IV STUDENT AID
Title IV student aid represents one of many possible approaches
to increasing access to higher education. This Part explores the
evolution of Title IV’s student-oriented financial-aid model and
outlines the regulatory regime surrounding the program.
A. The Preeminence of Market-Oriented Student Aid
16

Prior to the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (G.I. Bill),
federal support for higher education took the form of direct support
for public institutions, such as land grants for state universities
17
through legislation such as the Morrill Act. The G.I. Bill, by
contrast, created a student-aid program oriented around portable

14. See infra Part IV. This Note also argues that more finely tuned regulation, although
potentially helpful, does not sufficiently solve this fundamental dilemma. See infra Part IV.C.
15. The public-supply model entails supporting public educational institutions as a means
of reducing the price of education for students. Pusser, supra note 13, at 34–35.
16. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (G.I. Bill), ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284, replaced by
Veterans’ Benefits, Pub. L. No. 85-857, 72 Stat. 1105 (1958) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C.
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
17. Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–309
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011)); see also GARY A. BERG, LESSONS FROM THE EDGE: FOR-PROFIT AND
NONTRADITIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 40 (2005) (describing the Morrill Act,
which provided land grants to endow colleges designated by a state’s legislature, and its
importance to the development of state institutions of higher education).
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18

subsidies. Title IV of the HEA further expanded upon this model by
offering grants to the neediest students and a guaranteed student-loan
19
program to low- and middle-income students. The guaranteed
student-loan program encouraged private lenders to offer student
20
loans on favorable terms to the borrower.
Though students at for-profit institutions were allowed to receive
21
funds from the original G.I. Bill, the for-profit sector was associated
22
with “[s]candals, fraud, and abuse.” As a result, the HEA originally
only offered aid to students at nonprofit higher-education
23
institutions. In 1972, Congress reaffirmed its commitment to using
24
portable subsidies when it amended the HEA to make Title IV
25
funds available to students at for-profit and career-oriented schools.
Future amendments also shared the goal of expanding access to
26
higher education through portable subsidies.

18. See Pusser, supra note 13, at 36 (“GI Bill grants . . . were awarded to individuals rather
than to institutions and served as a forerunner to [Title IV] . . . .”). See supra note 13 for a brief
description of the portable-subsidy student-aid model.
19. S. REP. NO. 89-621, at 23 (1965). Educational opportunity grants were later renamed
Pell Grants. Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, tit. IV, pt. A, sec. 402(a),
§ 411(a)(1)(C), 94 Stat. 1367, 1401 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1070(a) (2006 & Supp.
IV 2011)).
20. Jonathan D. Glater, The Other Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow College Students
To Borrow More Through Federal Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 21
(2011).
21. See G.I. Bill §§ 3, 11, 58 Stat. at 288–90 (stating that students could receive aid for
enrolling “at any approved educational or training institution,” defined broadly without
reference to the nonprofit or for-profit status of the institution).
22. KEVIN KINSER, FROM MAIN STREET TO WALL STREET: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 21 (2006).
23. See, e.g., Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, tit. IV, pt. B, § 421(a)(1),
79 Stat. 1232, 1236 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1071 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)) (opening
the guaranteed loan program to “[s]tates and nonprofit private institutions and organizations”).
24. Cf. Pusser & Wolcott, supra note 2, at 170 (“[A] contest was waged over whether the
focus of federal financial support should be on institutions . . . or on direct student aid . . . .”).
25. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. I, pt. D, § 417B(a), 86 Stat.
235, 258, replaced by Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 94 Stat. 1367
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 640c-2, scattered sections of 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. § 2753
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). The HEA was expanded to include for-profit institutions in order to
“broaden the range of options beyond traditional baccalaureate programs.” Sarah E. Turner,
For-Profit Colleges in the Context of the Market for Higher Education, in EARNINGS FROM
LEARNING: THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 2, at 51, 55.
26. For example, the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-49,
93 Stat. 351, enacted measures to entice private lenders to lend at larger amounts to students at
for-profit institutions. These efforts to expand the impact of Title IV have continued to the
present day, marked by the elimination of the 50-percent rule for distance education, see infra
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The evolution of the Title IV program reflects a longstanding
commitment to expanding access for students within the market for
higher education. Broad societal access to higher education is thought
to provide certain civic benefits, such as increasing the population’s
27
ability to participate in democratic institutions, developing future
28
leaders, addressing shortages of skilled or educated workers, and
promoting American competitiveness in scientific and technological
29
development. If higher education furthers the public good, as the
HEA appears to contemplate, then government intervention to
30
increase production is justified. Of course, higher education confers
31
substantial private benefits on individuals as well. Even in 1965,
higher education was seen as increasingly necessary for modern
32
workers, a trend that has only accelerated in the modern
33
information economy.
Federal efforts to expand access to higher education can
generally be classified under one of two approaches. The publicsupply model involves direct public investment in educational
34
institutions. These subsidized institutions, in turn, can expand access
to higher education because they can offer education at a lower price.
35
This is the dominant approach at the state level —states operate
note 73, and the federal government becoming the direct lender for all Title IV loans in 2010
and reinvesting the savings into the Pell Grant program, Glater, supra note 20, at 31.
27. Pusser, supra note 13, at 37.
28. Glater, supra note 20, at 18.
29. See S. REP. NO. 89-621, at 20 (1965) (“[C]urrent and future shortages of trained
personnel present a serious threat to an expanding and viable economy.”).
30. See Glater, supra note 20, at 36 (exploring congressional rhetoric about the need for the
nation to expand access to higher education).
31. See id. at 37 (listing economic benefits associated with education, including higher
levels of employment and wealth, mobility within the labor market, and better working
conditions).
32. See S. REP. NO. 89-621, at 4 (“Schooling has become and will continue increasingly to
be a normal part of adult life.”).
33. See Aaron N. Taylor, “Your Results May Vary”: Protecting Students and Taxpayers
Through Tighter Regulation of Proprietary School Representations, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 729, 744–
45 (2010) (“This relatively new emphasis on knowledge as a tool of economic vitality has . . .
changed the motivations and mindsets of students.”).
34. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
35. See Bridget Terry Long, Does the Format of a Financial Aid Program Matter? The
Effect of State In-Kind Tuition Subsidies. 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 767, 767 (2004) (“State
appropriations to public colleges form the most significant higher aid policy in the United
States.”); see also e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 388.1801 (West 2012) (appropriating state
funds directly to state institutions and, in much smaller quantities, to student financial-aid
programs); Act of Dec. 20, 2011, S.H.B. 2058, pt. VI, §§ 601–609, 2011 Wash. Adv. Legis. Serv.
2nd Spec. Sess. Ch. 9 (Lexis Nexis) (allocating over $2 billion to state universities and
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massive public university systems, in addition to community
36
colleges—and abroad. Before the HEA, the direct support of
institutions was also the federal government’s dominant approach,
through programs such as the Morrill Act that assisted states in
37
providing affordable higher education.
By contrast, the portable-subsidy model embodied by Title IV
involves granting students portable government benefits, such as
grants or loans with favorable terms, to expand access to higher
38
education by enabling the student to defray the costs of attendance.
These two approaches may seem similar, but the differences between
funding an institution and funding an individual student are great.
Title IV, therefore, represents a major shift in federal highereducation policy. In an effort to “provid[e] the necessary and needed
tools” for higher education, the federal government primarily shifted
those tools to students as market actors rather than to state and local
39
higher-education institutions.
B. Title IV Eligibility for Institutions
A complicated regulatory triad determines a higher-education
provider’s eligibility to receive Title IV funds from students. The triad
consists of state government, the higher-education industry, and the

community colleges over two years and $300 million to financial aid); FISCAL SERVS. DIV.,
IOWA LEGIS. SERVS. AGENCY, SUMMARY OF FY 2012 BUDGET AND DEPARTMENT REQUESTS
73–76 (2010), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/DOCS/lsaReports/BudgetAnalysis/Budg
Analysis2012.pdf (cataloguing nearly $500 million allocated by the state to fund its universities,
in contrast to under $60 million for the state’s financial aid budget).
36. David D. Dill, Allowing the Market To Rule: The Case of the United States, 57 HIGHER
EDUC. Q. 136, 137 (2003).
37. Id. at 136; supra note 15. Given the diversity of actions this approach contemplates and
their varied policy implications, for the purposes of this Note, readers are encouraged to
envision simple grants to states or state public institutions as a paradigmatic manifestation of the
public-supply model. Federal support for educational institutions could, however, take
innumerable forms. On one extreme, the federal government could invest in operating its own
educational institutions, and investments under the public-supply model need not be limited to
public institutions—substantial tax breaks offered to public and private nonprofit educators
alike would qualify as well.
38. See Pusser, supra note 13, at 32 (explaining that the HEA is founded upon a market
model). The Pell Grant, essentially an education voucher, is perhaps the quintessential example
of the portable-subsidy model. See supra note 13.
39. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1104; see also David W. Breneman, Brian Pusser & Sarah E.
Turner, The Contemporary Provision of For-Profit Higher Education: Mapping the Competitive
Market, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING: THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 2,
at 3, 6 (“HEA also shifted control of the largest share of federal financial-aid dollars from
institutions to individuals.”).
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federal government. Title IV requires states to establish “minimum
41
standards for integrity, financial stability, and educational quality.”
States also regulate higher-education providers through a variety of
channels unrelated to Title IV eligibility, such as consumer-protection
42
statutes and tort law.
Title IV requires higher-education institutions to be accredited
43
by a federally recognized accrediting agency. Accrediting agencies,
which are made up of professionals from the education industry,
44
evaluate educational methods. Though accreditation has become a
critical part of the government’s Title IV regulatory structure, to
accreditors, the process is not viewed as a method of ensuring
45
minimum educational standards.
In determining eligibility for Title IV, the federal government,
through the Department of Education, declines to evaluate
46
pedagogical effectiveness. The Department of Education does,
however, certify accreditation organizations; only certified accreditors
47
may grant the accreditation required for Title IV eligibility. These
federal standards are generally procedural and structural, designed to
ensure that the accrediting agencies themselves are worthy arbiters of
48
quality. The federal government also monitors institutional
compliance with Title IV regulations to ensure only eligible students
49
receive federal student aid.
40. Mark L. Pelesh, Markets, Regulation, and Performance in Higher Education, in FORPROFIT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: THEIR MARKETS, REGULATION, PERFORMANCE, AND
PLACE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 91, 92 (Guilbert C. Hentschke, Vicente M. Lechuga & William
G. Tierney eds., 2010).
41. LISA K. FOSTER, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, CRB 04-010, FOR-PROFIT
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: OVERVIEW OF ACCREDITATION AND STATE
AND FEDERAL OVERSIGHT 3 (2004), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/04/10/04-010.pdf.
42. See Patrick F. Linehan, Note, Dreams Protected: A New Approach to Policing
Proprietary Schools’ Misrepresentations, 89 GEO. L.J. 753, 763–78 (2001) (discussing state-level
public and private law relating to for-profit institutions).
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(j) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
44. Pelesh, supra note 40, at 92.
45. JANE V. WELLMAN, COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION, RECOGNITION
OF ACCREDITATION ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARISON OF POLICY & PRACTICE OF
VOLUNTARY ACCREDITATION AND THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 4
(1998), available at http://www.chea.org/pdf/RecognitionWellman_Jan1998.pdf.
46. Pelesh, supra note 40, at 92.
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a).
48. WELLMAN, supra note 45, at 3.
49. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-600, PROPRIETARY
SCHOOLS: STRONGER DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE
ONLY ELIGIBLE STUDENTS RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDENT AID (2009), available at
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Finally, the Department of Education also administers a variety
of institutional-eligibility rules regarding receipt of Title IV funds. If
an institution’s former students have unacceptably high cohort default
rates on Title IV loans, for example, the institution loses the ability to
50
accept Title IV funds. A cohort default rate is a measure of the
number of students who default on their student loans compared to
the total number of students who began repayment on their loans at
51
the beginning of a measured period. Loans are considered to be in
default if a student is 270 or 360 days behind payments—depending
52
on the loan—within the first three years of repayment.
Some Department of Education rules apply only to for-profit
institutions. The 90/10 rule, for example, requires that a school
53
receive at least 10 percent of its revenue from non-Title IV sources.
Federal and state student aid from other programs, such as veterans’
benefits or federal and state job training grants, actually count toward
the 10 percent, along with institutional loans offered to students by
54
the school itself. Additionally, for-profit institutions are barred in
55
most instances from offering recruiters incentive-based payments.
Finally, a for-profit institution must offer programs that prepare
56
students for “gainful employment in a recognized occupation.” For
most of the statute’s history, this HEA provision had little force
because it merely prohibited programs with no direct connection to
57
recognized occupations. In 2011, however, Department of Education
http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/294057.pdf (examining the rigor of Title IV compliance oversight
by the Department of Education).
50. 34 C.F.R. § 668.206(a) (2012).
51. Johnson, supra note 6 at 233.
52. 34 C.F.R. § 668.183(c).
53. Id. § 668.28(a).
54. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-4, FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS: LARGE
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOLS THAT SPECIALIZE IN HEALTHCARE ARE MORE LIKELY TO RELY
HEAVILY ON FEDERAL STUDENT AID 14 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
320/310897.pdf; see also infra Part III.B.2.
55. 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(i) (2011), vacated in part by Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. &
Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The D.C. Circuit required the Department of
Education to retain a safe-harbor rule allowing incentive compensation based upon students’
program completion rates. Id. at 448.
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
57. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-OIG/A09E0015,
UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX’S PROCESSING OF STUDENT FINANCIAL AID DISBURSEMENTS FOR
THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT, TITLE IV PROGRAMS 8 (2005), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/a09e0015.pdf (interpreting the “gainful
employment” provision, 34 C.F.R. § 668.8 (2005), to prohibit the University of Phoenix to
receive Title IV funds for an associate’s degree program in General Studies).
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regulations attempted to condition Title IV eligibility on student
outcomes: measures of students’ loan repayment and debt-to-earnings
58
ratios. Those debt measures, however, were vacated by a federal
district court in 2012, and when—or in what form—they will take
59
effect remains in doubt.
II. FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION
For-profit institutions are a major force within the modern
higher-education industry. This Part explains the historical evolution
and defining characteristics of the industry and explores the
theoretical justifications supporting the for-profit sector’s social value.
This Part then analyzes negative student outcomes closely associated
with many for-profit institutions.
A. Overview of the For-Profit Higher-Education Industry
1. History and recent growth. The modern for-profit highereducation industry is marked by the incredible diversity of its
60
institutions. The University of Phoenix, a giant in the industry and
by far the largest of all of the corporate schools, boasts hundreds of
thousands of students, campuses across America, and programs in

58. For a full explanation of how these measures were calculated, see 34 C.F.R. § 668.7
(2011), vacated by Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, No. 11-1314 (RC), 2012
WL 20505237 (D.D.C. June 30, 2012).
59. Duncan, 2012 WL 2505237, at *1. It is quite possible—perhaps even likely—that these
rules will reemerge soon. The district court found that the gainful employment rules themselves
were a permissible exercise of the Department of Education’s rulemaking authority in this
arena. Id. at *8. Rather, the specific thresholds set by the Department of Education for the loanrepayment measures were arbitrary and capricious, “not based upon any facts at all.” Id. at *1,
*15. The other student outcome measures were found to be inseverable from the loanrepayment measure and the entire substantive rule was vacated. Id. at *16. Nevertheless, the
Department of Education plans to use its established rulemaking authority to restore the
framework designed by the gainful-employment rules. Goldie Blumenstyk & Charles
Huckabee, Judge’s Ruling on ‘Gainful Emplyoment’ Gives Each Side Something To Cheer,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 2, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Ruling-on-GainfulEmployment/132737.
60. This Note will only discuss for-profit institutions that offer a bona-fide educational
experience to students. For an overview of the phenomenon of “diploma mills,” which are
businesses that provide unearned educational certification, see generally Amanda Harmon
Cooley & Aaron Cooley, From Diploma Mills to For-Profit Colleges and Universities: Business
Opportunities, Regulatory Challenges, and Consumer Responsibility in Higher Education, 18 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 505 (2009).
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61

many fields and at virtually all degree levels. Yet most for-profit
institutions serve fewer than one hundred students and provide
62
training in a specific field such as hair styling or clerical work.
63
The for-profit higher-education industry traces back centuries.
Generous Progressive-era programs following the public-supply
model diminished the sector’s influence in the early twentieth
century, as the modern research university became prominent and as
states began to sponsor vocational education through community
64
colleges. The 1972 amendments to the HEA transformed the
65
industry by opening for-profit schools up for federal student aid.
Meanwhile, increasing employer demand for trained white-collar
workers made students more willing to buy what for-profit educators
66
were selling.
For-profit institutions capitalized on these
opportunities. Between the 1970s and the 2000s the industry “shifted
from one of loosely affiliated, independently operated vocational
schools to one that is streamlined, highly sophisticated, and investor67
focused.”
Beginning in the 1990s, the for-profit sector became marked by
68
massive, publicly traded companies. For-profit institutions have
always aggressively controlled their costs, but it was not until this
69
period that the industry fully realized profitable economies of scale.
Between 1998 and 2008, enrollment at for-profit schools increased by
225 percent; by the end of that period enrollment totaled nearly
70
twenty million students. Between 2008 and 2010, the rate of
71
increases in enrollment within the sector doubled. A small number
of large schools are responsible for this increase. In 2009, five

61. David W. Breneman, The University of Phoenix: Icon of For-Profit Higher Education,
in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 2, at 71, 71–73.
62. Linehan, supra note 42, at 755–56.
63. RICHARD S. RUCH, HIGHER ED., INC.: THE RISE OF THE FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITY
54–57 (2001).
64. KINSER, supra note 22, at 19.
65. Breneman et al., supra note 39, at 6.
66. See supra note 33.
67. Johnson, supra note 26, at 230.
68. KINSER, supra note 22, at 22.
69. See id. at 85–89 (discussing how for-profit institutions generate economies of scale).
70. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FORPROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 2 (2010).
71. Goodman, supra note 10.
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institutions alone enrolled over 800,000 students. Much of that
growth was fueled by online education. After the 2005 repeal of the
50-percent rule, which prohibited Title IV-eligible schools from
enrolling more than half of their students in distance-education
courses, for-profit schools expanded their online programs with vigor,
73
and new, predominantly online institutions emerged. In fact, forprofit institutions now enroll more students online than at physical
74
campuses. Higher education can be a lucrative business. The eight
largest publicly held and the eight largest privately held for-profit
75
institutions earned a combined profit of $2.7 billion dollars in 2009.
2. Students at for-profit institutions. Student populations in the
for-profit sector are as diverse as the institutions themselves, with
demographics varying depending on the degree programs offered.
For-profit institutions serve comparatively more low-income students
and members of underrepresented minority groups than nonprofit
76
institutions, and the industry caters to first-generation college
77
students. For-profit schools have also been enormously successful in
78
attracting older adult students. The diversity of the student
population is unsurprising, given the industry’s traditional focus on
vocational training. As the industry has grown, however, much of the
growth has come from students pursuing four-year degrees, not from
79
vocational education.
B. For-Profit Higher Education in Theory
Proponents of the for-profit sector contend that the sector’s
increasing success is a reflection of the changing nature of higher

72. Taylor, supra note 33, at 756.
73. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., at 2.
74. Jason G. Caudill, Questions and Research Opportunities in Online Education, 39 BRIT.
J. EDUC. TECH. 920, 920 (2008).
75. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., THE RETURN ON THE
FEDERAL INVESTMENT IN FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION: DEBT WITHOUT A DIPLOMA 4 (2010).
76. Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 112th Cong. 6 (2011) (statement of
Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College Access and Success), available at
http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Abernathy.pdf.
77. BERG, supra note 17, at 79.
78. RUCH, supra note 63, at 145–46; James, supra note 8, at 83.
79. KINSER, supra note 22, at 73.
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education. In a globalized, information-based economy, higher
education—whether it takes the form of a certificate, a two-year
degree, a four-year degree, or beyond—is increasingly necessary for
81
the American workforce. Students “increasingly view[] education as
82
a product and themselves as consumers.” This notion of the studentas-consumer has fundamentally altered the student-educator
relationship.
This consumer-centric view of education comports well with the
for-profit education model. To schools like the University of Phoenix,
83
education is a product, and students are consumers. For-profit
schools tout their no-frills, businesslike approach, and many students
84
respond favorably. Students at for-profit institutions seek a specific
educational experience, tailored toward career advancement, and
have little desire for all the trappings of a traditional undergraduate
85
education.
Furthermore, for-profit institutions have stepped into a void not
filled by traditional higher education, an industry that is to some
degree unwilling to meet this increasing demand for higher education.
Nonprofit institutions are certainly not required to pursue growth
strategies, and in practice they do not—often opting to increase their
86
institutional prestige instead. By maintaining restrictive admission

80. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 135–59 (discussing the changes taking place in higher
education and what nonprofit institutions could learn from for-profit schools).
81. See Taylor, supra note 33, at 744 (“[J]ust like the knowledge-based economy facilitates
opportunity and success for possessors of vital knowledge, [higher education] ‘increasingly
eliminates those without education and training beyond high school from employment
opportunities that can support a middle-class standard of living.’” (quoting NAT’L CTR. FOR
PUB. POLICY & HIGHER EDUC., MEASURING UP 2006: THE NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON
HIGHER EDUCATION 20 (2006), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/News/Press_Releases/Higher_education_performance/Measuring_Up_2006
.pdf)).
82. Taylor, supra note 33, at 745.
83. RUCH, supra note 63, at 144.
84. See id. at 132–34 (illustrating the “no-nonsense academic experience” provided by forprofit institutions).
85. See id. at 134 (“For-profit students are serious about their studies. Their goal is to ‘get
in, get out, and get a job,’ and they are not particularly concerned about their collegiate social
life. . . .”); see also Michelle Howard-Vital, The Appeal of For-Profit Institutions, CHANGE:
MAG. HIGHER LEARNING, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 68, 70 (“Although for-profits rarely offer extensive
campus and student activities in comparison to more traditional institutions, students do not
appear to miss them.”).
86. RUCH, supra note 63, at 16.
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standards, many nonprofit schools exclude large populations of
87
students, but for-profit institutions are open to anyone who can pay.
But admissions standards do not tell the whole story. The
nonprofit institutions that place the least emphasis on admissions
standards, such as community colleges, are also becoming less able to
88
increase access to education. State funding for public institutions,
once merely trending downward, has plummeted because of
89
recessionary budget shortfalls. As a result of decreased public
financial support, tuition has increased sharply when it merely
90
increased steadily in the past. Because public institutions seek to
expand access to higher education by using direct subsidies to keep
91
tuition prices low, the erosion of those subsidies—and the
commensurate increase in tuition prices—greatly impairs those
institutions’ ability to expand access to higher education.
Traditional higher education is also an industry dominated by
92
norms and tradition. For all their virtues, these norms cause
traditional colleges and universities to be slow to respond to threats
93
or opportunities. For-profit schools share none of these constraints,
94
and they respond rapidly to market changes. For example, many
institutions have virtually eliminated admissions standards to take

87. Cf. Dill, supra note 36, at 149 (noting nonprofit institutions’ “overwhelming focus on
admissions selectivity”). Title IV, of course, seeks to ensure that, if admitted to a highereducation institution, anyone can pay.
88. See STEPHEN G. KATSINAS, MARK M. D’AMICO & JANICE N. FRIEDEL, ACCESS AND
FUNDING IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION—THE 2011 NATIONAL SURVEY (2011) (surveying
diminishing financial resources for public education). On the other hand, arguments can be
made that consumer demand is actually unduly inflated because of Title IV student aid policies.
See infra Part IV.B.
89. KATSINAS ET AL., supra note 88, at 4; see also Lee Gardner & Goldie Blumenstyk, At
Calif. Public Colleges, Dreams Deferred, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 17, 2012, at A4
(outlining how state budget cuts greatly constrain California state universities’ educational
capacities).
90. KATSINAS ET AL., supra note 88, at 6.
91. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
92. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 149 (“[M]any traditional colleges and universities have
been resistant to change, responding slowly and adapting reluctantly.”); cf. Dill, supra note 36,
at 139 n.3 (“[A]cademic freedom and tenure in the US has been more influenced by
professional norms and sanctions than by government regulation.”).
93. See, e.g., RUCH, supra note 63, at 14 (“Standing in the way of quick, effective decision
making is the tradition of shared governance.”).
94. See id. at 149 (acknowledging “how quickly and effectively some of the for-profit
education companies have responded to change”).
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advantage of the “disadvantaged student market.” For-profit
institutions offer targeted, in-demand programs, lack tenure, conduct
96
no research, and operate year-round.
If the purpose of the HEA is to expand access to higher
education for those who are otherwise unable to participate, then
arguably no sector of the higher-education industry serves that
97
purpose better than the for-profit sector. By catering to groups that
have been traditionally absent from higher education, for-profit
98
institutions are expanding access. Proponents also argue that forprofit institutions achieve the goal of expanding access to higher
education at less cost to the taxpayer than would nonprofit
institutions. For-profit institutions receive almost all their revenue
99
from tuition. By contrast, public institutions receive a smaller
portion of their revenues via tuition and a large proportion from
100
public subsidy. Private nonprofit institutions receive comparatively
less revenue from tuition and rely on donations to cover the
101
balance. Nonprofit institutions also receive significant tax breaks,
whereas for-profit institutions pay taxes on the profits they
102
generate. Finally, proponents of the for-profit sector argue that
their profit motive leads to pedagogical innovation in comparison to
103
calcified traditional institutions.
C. Negative Outcomes Associated with the For-Profit Sector
1. Unsavory Practices. Unfortunately, the practices of many forprofit institutions may undermine their proponents’ arguments.
Unlawful conduct appears to flourish within the sector. Between 1998
95. Bonnie K. Fox Garrity, Mark J. Garrison & Roger C. Fiedler, Access for Whom, Access
to What? The Role of the “Disadvantaged Student” Market in the Rise of For-Profit Higher
Education in the United States, 8 J. FOR CRITICAL EDUC. POL’Y STUD. 203, 205 (2010).
96. RUCH, supra note 63, at 75.
97. See BERG, supra note 17, at 79 (explaining the University of Phoenix’s desire to offer
an efficient education that is “tied closely to the desire to provide access to diverse
populations”).
98. See Garrity et al., supra note 95, at 219 (highlighting how the for-profit sector attracts
disproportionate numbers of minority and low-income students).
99. RUCH, supra note 63, at 98. The remaining 5 percent comes from ancillary operations
such as bookstores. Id.
100. Id. at 97–98.
101. Id. at 98.
102. Id. at 101.
103. Michael J. Seiden, For-Profit Colleges Deserve Some Respect, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
July 10, 2009, at A80.
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and 2004, 74 percent of the Department of Education’s institutional
104
fraud cases involved for-profit schools, and the industry’s troubled
105
history is well documented. The industry seems to be rid of schools
that solicited enrollments and delivered literally nothing in return, but
deceptive and fraudulent recruitment practices and unlawful receipt
106
of Title IV aid still persist.
Much of this unlawful conduct stems from the heavy institutional
emphasis on recruiting within the for-profit sector. Many for-profit
schools run massive, aggressive sales operations, with teams of
107
recruiters in call centers hunting any and all prospective students.
Many institutions’ recruiting strategies target the “disadvantaged
108
student” and “inflate the high hopes of many students who may be
109
unlikely to achieve the promised successes.” Student website
110
queries can result in hundreds of calls. Military students are
targeted with particular zeal, thanks to their generous veterans’
111
benefits.
Even though institutions may not offer recruiters
112
incentive-based pay in most instances, recruiters nonetheless feel
tremendous pressure to bring in students, resulting in unlawful
conduct even when the institutions themselves publicly disclaim such
104. DEANNE LOONIN & JULIA DEVANTHÉRY, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., MAKING
THE NUMBERS COUNT: WHY PROPRIETARY SCHOOL PERFORMANCE DATA DOESN’T ADD UP

WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 11 (2005). For-profit institutions account for less than 40
percent of all higher-education institutions and only about 9 percent of all enrollments. Guilbert
C. Hentchke, Vicente M. Lechuga & William G. Tierney, For-Profit Colleges and Universities in
a Knowledge Economy, in FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: THE RISE OF FORPROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 40, at 1, 2.
105. See, e.g., Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges,
supra note 76, at 14–16 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College
Access and Success) (chronicling decades of concern over practices at for-profit institutions); see
also supra notes 10, 22 and accompanying text.
106. LOONIN & DEVANTHÉRY, supra note 104, at 10.
107. E.g., Barry Yeoman, The High Price of For-Profit Colleges, ACADEME, May–June
2011, at 32, 34.
108. Garrity et al., supra note 95, at 204–05.
109. Joshua Woods, Opportunity, Ease, Encouragement, and Shame: A Short Course in
Pitching For-Profit Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 13, 2006, at B10.
110. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES:
UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED IN
DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 15 (2010), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125197.pdf.
111. See generally S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG.,
BENEFITTING WHOM? FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION COMPANIES AND THE GROWTH OF MILITARY
EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS (2010) (explaining the perverse incentives created by generous
military educational-benefits programs); see also infra notes 207–209 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
AND
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An undercover investigation by the Government
behavior.
Accountability Office (GAO) found that recruiters at every for-profit
school targeted by the study made deceptive, if not totally fraudulent,
114
statements to investigators posing as prospective students. For
example, one school told the GAO’s undercover applicant that
barbers could earn $250,000 per year; others encouraged the
undercover applicant to take out large amounts of debt because “no
115
one will come after you if you don’t pay.”
Educational expenses are minimized at many for-profit colleges
and universities. The largest and most successful corporate schools
116
standardize the curriculum and de-emphasize the faculty. At the
University of Phoenix, most of the instructors are part-time, and
117
central administrators determine course content. Some major forprofit institutions spend more of their budgets on recruiting than on
118
education. Others receive more revenue from Pell Grants alone
119
than they spend in total instructional expenses. There is nothing
legally problematic with such an arrangement, because Title IV does
not require a school to allocate a certain amount of its budget toward
120
education.
2. Debt, Dropouts, and Defaults. Despite their low operating
costs, for-profit institutions are expensive. Most for-profit programs
121
cost more than the average nonprofit program, and students at forprofit institutions are more likely to borrow than students at their
113. Even some industry proponents have difficulty denying this point. See, e.g., RUCH,
supra note 63, at 96 (“[For-profit institutions] use selling techniques to enroll students, leading
them through a decision process that, however inadvertently, is not always based on accurate
information, may sometimes lead to a certain amount of misrepresentation, and usually involves
sales closure tactics that pressure students to sign up.”).
114. For examples of these statements, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 110, at app. I.
115. Id. at 10, 12–13.
116. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 112, 118 (noting that for-profit institutions tend to manage
the curriculum centrally and minimize the governing role of faculty).
117. Breneman, supra note 61, at 77.
118. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FORPROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 6 (2010).
119. Garrity et al., supra note 95, at 217. There are some nonprofit institutions that do this
as well, but there are comparatively few of them. Id.
120. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., at 5.
121. Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges, supra note
76, at 14 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College Access and
Success).
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nonprofit counterparts. When students do borrow, they usually
123
borrow more than students at nonprofit institutions. This is true
124
even after accounting for demographics. Sometimes loans offered
through federal aid programs do not cover the total costs of attending
school, and students at for-profit institutions are more likely to take
125
out private loans to cover the remaining cost. For-profit institutions
themselves are increasingly likely to offer students loans after a 2008
126
regulatory reform relaxed the 90/10 rule.
Large amounts of debt lead to poor student outcomes in two
ways. First, even if a student’s earning power increases as a result of
the degree, the student may not earn enough to repay his or her
student loans. It is difficult to determine what proportion of for-profit
college graduates are unable to find “gainful employment” or a use
127
for their degree or certificate, but anecdotes of graduates who find
128
that their degrees are formally or informally unrecognized by
129
employers are common. According to one study, students of forprofit institutions who dropped out are less likely to default on their
loans than students who earn degrees, because so many graduates are

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 4.
DEANNE LOONIN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PILING IT ON: THE GROWTH OF
PROPRIETARY SCHOOL LOANS AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR STUDENTS 25–27 (2011).
Institutional loans are no longer counted within the “90” part of the 90/10 rule’s calculation. 34
C.F.R. § 668.28(a) (2012).
127. For an overview of the inadequacies of student-performance data collection and
reporting, see LOONIN & DEVANTHÉRY, supra note 104, at 36–38.
128. When schools are sued for fraudulent recruitment tactics, the suits often concern a
school’s lack of authority to confer required professional licensing. See, e.g., Class Action
Complaint at 24–28, Montgomery v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 10CH50281 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov.
23, 2010) (No. 10CH50281), 2010 WL 4815908, ¶¶ 103–13 (alleging that Everest College
recruited students for a Medical Assistant program without the accreditation required for
students to obtain employment after graduation).
129. See, e.g., Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed. Reg.
34,386, 34,386–87 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668.7 (2011), vacated by Ass’n of
Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, No. 11-1314 (RC), 2012 WL 20505237 (D.D.C. June
30, 2012)) (discussing how, in addition to students who default on their loans, there is another
sizeable cohort of students who experience significant financial burdens as a result of an
education that did not help them advance in a career); see also Frontline: College, Inc., supra
note 10 (sharing stories of students’ negative outcomes after attending for-profit institutions).
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unable to pay their debt even if the degree increased their earning
130
power.
Yet even the students who do drop out remain saddled with
debt. Though graduation rates can vary dramatically from school to
school, for-profit students graduate at far lower rates than their
131
nonprofit counterparts. For example, the six-year graduation rate
for bachelor’s degree students is 22 percent at four-year for-profit
institutions, which is less than half of the rate at nonprofit
132
institutions. For certain demographic groups, the outcomes at forprofit schools are even more troubling. African-American students,
for example, graduate half as often—at a rate of just 16 percent—at
133
for-profit schools as they do at nonprofit schools. The data show
that many for-profit schools, particularly the largest institutions, are
churning students: in one year between 2008 and 2009, sixteen of the
largest for-profit institutions’ four-year degree programs turned over
134
more than 57 percent of their student body.
Students who attend for-profit schools are also more likely to
default on loans than their nonprofit counterparts. The Department
of Education estimates that students in two- and four-year programs
at for-profit institutions are three times as likely to default over the
lifetime of their federal Stafford loans compared to student borrowers
135
as a whole. Even controlling for student demographics and income,
students at for-profit schools are still significantly more likely to
136
default than other students. In 2010, the two-year default rate for
students at for-profit institutions was double that of students at
137
nonprofit institutions. Default rates on institutional loans are nearly
130. Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges, supra note
76, at 11 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College Access and
Success).
131. Id. at 9–10.
132. Id. at 9.
133. Id.
134. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FORPROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 5 (2010).
135. LOONIN, supra note 126, at 10.
136. JONATHAN GURYAN & MATTHEW THOMPSON, CHARLES RIVER ASSOCS., REPORT
ON GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT 15 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/assets/oira_1840/1840_04232010-h.pdf.
137. Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges, supra note
76, at 7 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College Access and
Success). Students at for-profit institutions make up only 10 percent of the student population.
Id.
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50 percent at some for-profit schools, and losses from private loans
grew so much that in 2008 some private lenders ceased lending to
139
students at for-profit schools altogether.
The consequences to students of defaulting on a loan are severe.
Federal student loans have some borrower-friendly protections built
in—such as favorable interest rates and income-based repayment—
140
but they are nearly impossible to discharge in bankruptcy.
Defaulting on federal student loans leads to harsh sanctions, such as
the garnishment of the student’s wages and ineligibility for student
141
aid in the future. Private and institutional loans are even worse.
They lack many of the federal loans’ consumer protections yet remain
nondischargeable in bankruptcy, often with significantly higher rates
142
and unfavorable terms. Because of these factors, one poor college143
borrowing decision can haunt a student for life.
Admittedly, education is difficult to measure and evaluate, and
as for-profit educators stress, their schools teach in innovative ways
144
that are even more difficult to assess, such as online-only education.
The for-profit sector, however, is results-oriented in a way traditional
145
nonprofit higher education is not. Students at for-profit institutions
are more interested in career advancement than in purely academic
146
147
pursuits,
and school recruitment tactics reflect this.
It is

138. LOONIN, supra note 126, at 19.
139. Id. at 10–11.
140. See DEANNE LOONIN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PAYING THE PRICE: THE HIGH
COST OF PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS AND THE DANGERS FOR STUDENT BORROWERS 12–15
(2008) (highlighting the differences between federal and private student loans). For an analysis
of how even the law of student loan dischargeability itself leads to poor outcomes for students,
see Amy E. Sparrow, Comment, Unduly Harsh: The Need To Examine Educational Value in
Student Loan Discharge Cases Involving For-Profit Trade Schools, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 329 (2007).
141. Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges, supra note
76, at 2 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College Access and
Success).
142. See LOONIN, supra note 140, at 2–6 (outlining the dangers of private loans); LOONIN,
supra note 126, at 2 (outlining the dangers of institutional loans).
143. See Daniel Golden, Homeless High School Dropouts Lured by For-Profit Colleges,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2010, 12:01 AM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0430/homeless-dropouts-from-high-school-lured-by-for-profit-colleges-with-cash.html (“In the
Cleveland shelters, you can still find people with trade school debts from 20 years ago.”).
144. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
145. See Ann I. Morey, Globalization and the Emergence of For-Profit Higher Education, 48
HIGHER EDUC. 131, 143 (2004) (comparing for-profit institutions’ missions with those of liberalarts educators).
146. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
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appropriate, therefore, to evaluate for-profit institutions based on
student outcomes because the institutions themselves promise
positive student outcomes.
III. FOR-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS AND THE LAW
Federal student aid has fueled the success of for-profit
institutions. This Part explains how Title IV has enabled the for-profit
higher-education industry’s growth and, with it, the incidence of
negative student outcomes. Section B examines why the surrounding
legal and regulatory regime is unable to prevent those negative
outcomes.
A. The Impact of Title IV on For-Profit Institutions
1. The For-Profit Business Model. Throughout the 2000s, the
Apollo Group, which is the parent company of the University of
148
Phoenix, was an extremely profitable investment. But in 2005,
shareholders sued the corporation for securities fraud, alleging that
Apollo had failed to disclose a Department of Education report that
found that the University of Phoenix had violated Title IV’s incentive
149
compensation bans. The mere threat that Phoenix would become
150
ineligible for Title IV funds was worth $277 million to the investors.
As noted earlier, tuition payments account for a significantly
higher percentage of revenue at for-profit institutions than at
151
nonprofit institutions. Federal student aid makes up a substantial
portion of those tuition revenues. Federal aid, from all sources, makes
147. See Woods, supra note 109 (“The advisors almost always described the benefits of
education in terms of future material rewards . . . .”).
148. For a discussion of Phoenix’s attractiveness to investors, see Andreas Ortmann, Capital
Romance: Why Wall Street Fell in Love with Higher Education, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING:
THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 2, at 145.
149. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 04-2147-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 3072731, at *1
(D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2008), rev’d, No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988 (9th Cir. June 3, 2010); Doug
Lederman, Jury Orders U. of Phoenix Parent To Pay $277 Million, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Jan. 17,
2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/01/17/apollo.
150. See Lead Plaintiff, the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago’s
Consolidated Class Action Complaint for Violations of Federal Securities Laws at 11–12, In re
Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731 (Lead Case No. CV 04-2147-PHX-JAT), 2005
WL 6259503 (“Because for-profit secondary education providers . . . are so dependent on Title
IV loan programs, any negative or potentially adverse news or announcements that might
impact Title IV qualification . . . are important to reasonable investors and are material to the
market.” (emphasis omitted)).
151. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
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up nearly 90 percent of the revenue for fourteen of the largest for152
profit institutions. In 2009, Title IV aid alone accounted for over
three quarters of the overall revenue of the five largest for-profit
153
schools. This degree of reliance on Title IV funds is characteristic of
the for-profit sector. For-profit institutions enroll a tenth of all
students in higher education and receive almost one quarter of all
154
Title IV funds.
2. Title IV’s Role in Fueling Negative Student Outcomes.
Reliance on tuition revenue, particularly Title IV student aid, helps to
explain two noteworthy practices within the for-profit sector. First,
the reliance on tuition revenue sheds some light on the intense
recruiting focus of many for-profit institutions. Without other sources
155
of revenue, enrollment growth is necessary for revenue growth.
Second, the fact that Title IV need-based aid has proved so lucrative
illuminates why the student populations at for-profit institutions
differ from those at nonprofit institutions. Students whom traditional
institutions consider to be unqualified for admission are, for the most
part, still eligible to borrow money to pay for an education at a for156
profit institution. The result is an industry full of institutions that
are “built to swallow Title IV funds in the way a whale gathers up
157
plankton.”
In some sense, this extensive recruiting activity by for-profit
institutions serves the purposes of the HEA because the federal
158
student-aid program looks to increase access to higher education.
More access is thought to be better, and it is imperative for
historically underserved, low-income, and nontraditional students to
159
pursue higher education.
For-profit institutions have been

152. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., THE RETURN ON THE
FEDERAL INVESTMENT IN FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION: DEBT WITHOUT A DIPLOMA 10 (2010).
153. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FORPROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (2010).
154. Id.
155. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 85–88 (explaining pricing strategies at for-profit
institutions).
156. See BERG, supra note 17, at 67 (“[T]he University of Phoenix . . . counters criticism of
its open admissions policy with accusations of elitism. . . . [A]nyone who wants an education
should be able to receive it.”).
157. Daniel Kruger, Blackboard Jungle, FORBES MAG., Dec. 13, 2004, at 118, 120.
158. See supra Part I.A.
159. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.
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successful at expanding access to these populations. But access to
higher education is not contemplated within the HEA as an end unto
161
itself, but rather a means to increased student and societal welfare.
For many students at for-profit institutions, Title IV only mires them
162
in debt. Even further, it appears that increased reliance on Title IV
itself is strongly correlated with negative student outcomes in the for163
profit sector. How does Title IV turn access to higher education
from an opportunity into a trap?
Under Title IV, a school suffers few consequences for negative
164
student outcomes. Students are responsible for paying their own
165
This
debt and the government assumes the risk of default.
arrangement bears a strong resemblance to the subprime mortgage
market, which flourished in the 2000s as many lenders avoided
166
bearing the risk from their lending activities. Lenders in the
subprime market profited by ignoring creditworthiness, increasing
167
lending activity, and divesting themselves of the risk. Title IV funds
are available to any student who has been admitted into an academic
or vocational program. Economic tests for student creditworthiness
168
were flatly rejected. In most other contexts, borrowers must pass
some measure of creditworthiness, and it is in the lender’s best
interest to lend only to worthy borrowers. Title IV encourages
schools to accept many students who must then borrow significant
160.
161.
162.
163.

See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-97-103, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS:
POORER STUDENT OUTCOMES AT SCHOOLS THAT RELY MORE ON FEDERAL AID 3 (1997),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-HEHS-97-103/pdf/GAOREPORTS
-HEHS-97-103.pdf.
164. Legal and regulatory devices meant to restrain school conduct are discussed infra Part
III.B.
165. See supra notes 121–147 and accompanying text.
166. For a comparison between the current market for student loans and the subprime
mortgage market, see LOONIN, supra note 140, at 6–9; compare Katherine Mangu-Ward,
Education for Profit: Why Is Everyone Flaming the University of Phoenix?, REASON, July 2008,
at 39, 40 (“As with subprimes, a nonnegligible portion of consumers won’t be able to stay afloat
. . . . But the students who do graduate—like the millions who use subprime deals to gain a
firmer foothold in the housing market—have a much different story to tell.”).
167. See, e.g., Martin F. Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the
Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis, 157 DE ECONOMIST 129, 139–42, 146–47 (2009) (“The risks
of [subprime] mortgage finance [were] thus transferred from the originating institution . . . .”).
168. See Glater, supra note 20, at 12 n.1 (citing one senator’s belief that an “economic test”
of creditworthiness would impose “an ever greater obstacle to higher education as rising prices
ma[k]e paying for college more challenging”).
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sums to attend, even if the schools would never lend to the students
169
themselves.
For a profit-maximizing institution, Title IV sets up a system of
perverse incentives. When a student takes out tens of thousands of
dollars in debt and receives little value in return, both the student and
the government are worse for the exchange, but the school keeps its
tuition dollars. When a student enrolls and receives a Pell Grant, only
to drop out after a few months, the student is somewhat worse off—
having exhausted his or her Pell Grant, which could have been
applied toward a future educational venture—but the government has
spent thousands of dollars with very little return, and the school has
received free money. Indeed, a for-profit institution earns its profits
by minimizing per-student expenditures and by maximizing student
debt. Because the students’ debt is owed to the government or private
lenders, rather than to the school, many schools have little stake in
their students’ outcomes.
3. Inadequacies of the Market Model for Higher Education.
Those within the for-profit higher-education industry believe that
170
market pressures mitigate Title IV’s perverse incentives. This
argument can be articulated in two ways. One view is that the student
consumers can and will differentiate between high- and low-quality
institutions, weeding out institutions that fail to deliver value to
171
students. The other view is that the marketplace merely reflects
consumer preferences, for better or for worse—that successful for172
profit schools are merely delivering what consumers demand.
The former explanation is incorrect, the latter, irrelevant. First,
students are not, in fact, able to evaluate accurately the quality of an
173
educational institution before enrollment. Information asymmetries
plague the enrollment process, and students simply cannot obtain the
data they would require to evaluate rigorously many for-profit

169. The existence of a burgeoning institutional-loan market does not contradict this
statement. As discussed infra Part III.B.2, institutional loans are likely viewed as loss leaders
that allow schools to preserve their 90-10 eligibility.
170. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 140–43 (naming the marketplace as a “guardian of
institutional quality and integrity”).
171. See Breneman, supra note 61, at 89 (“[A]n institution such as the University of Phoenix
has a huge stake in building and sustaining its reputation for quality, and . . . short-run profit
maximization . . . runs contrary to long-run profit maximization linked to reputation.”).
172. RUCH, supra note 63, at 144.
173. Pusser, supra note 13, at 32–33.

MCGUIRE IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

SUBPRIME EDUCATION

10/3/2012 1:49 PM

143

schools based on clear, objective criteria such as job placement or
174
completion numbers. The available data are often flawed or
175
unintelligible. Furthermore, many individuals recruited by for-profit
colleges are unfamiliar with the market for higher education and may
be easily swayed by a relentless aspirational campaign about their
educational investment—particularly when the federal government
176
will be providing generous assistance.
Second, massive federal intervention has already skewed the
market for higher education. The entire purpose of Title IV is to use
177
government aid to increase consumer demand for higher education.
Indeed, for-profit institutions receive such a high percentage of
tuition revenue from Title IV that government intervention—not any
inherent demand on the part of students—may be the prime mover in
178
the story of enrollment successes at many for-profit institutions.
When a government program drives consumer behavior, merely
positing that the market reflects consumer demand does not answer
the question of whether the market prevents misuses of that
government program. Surely Congress, when it enacted the HEA, did
179
not intend for Title IV to leave students worse off.
Furthermore, evidence suggests that the market for higher
education, propelled by Title IV portable-student subsidies, may play
a role in decreasing overall student welfare by leading to higher
prices. Because consumers are unable to evaluate institutions
accurately, students turn to secondary indicators of quality such as
180
181
prestige. But prestige is expensive to generate and maintain.
174. See LOONIN & DEVANTHÉRY, supra note 104, at 28–29 (“No admissions representative
gave official completion rate statistics. . . . Job placement rates were equally difficult to obtain.
Most admissions officers would not give placement in the form of a rate.”). For this study, the
authors attempted, often unsuccessfully, to obtain job-placement and completion-rate
information from schools and the federal and state regulatory bodies and accreditation agencies.
Id. at 27.
175. Id. at 35–39.
176. See Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,386,
34,456 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668.7 (2011), vacated by Ass’n of Private Sector
Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, No. 11-1314 (RC), 2012 WL 20505237 (D.D.C. June 30, 2012))
(“Students . . . often have limited information, little or no experience choosing [schools], and
asymmetric information . . . . [T]hese gaps in information sometimes lead to students and their
families making suboptimal choices. . . .”).
177. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 150, 152–154 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.
180. Dill, supra note 36, at 146–47.
181. Id. at 152–53.
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Indeed, this dynamic may be responsible for the steady rise in the
182
price of education at nonprofit institutions. In this respect, enabling
the student as a consumer could lead to students, as a group, being
worse off than otherwise. This is not to say that the market has no
value in sorting student consumers across the higher-education
landscape. Rather, the market simply does not sufficiently constrain
the conduct of for-profit institutions in a way that would satisfactorily
prevent negative student outcomes and abuse of the Title IV
program.
B. The Inadequacy of Available Legal Tools in Preventing Negative
Student Outcomes
To date, the Title IV regulatory regime has failed to prevent forprofit institutions from turning the program from an opportunity into
a trap. Individual students find that litigation provides redress in only
the most outrageous cases, because only a small portion of negative
student outcomes arise from clearly illegal conduct. Regulatory
devices meant to prevent abuse of Title IV have proven themselves
ineffective or easily evaded. And industry oversight, a keystone of the
Title IV regulatory triad, is not up to the task demanded of it.
1. Student Litigation Options and the Legality of a Bad Deal. A
variety of litigation options exist for students who find themselves
worse off after their experiences with for-profit institutions. Suits for
fraudulent misrepresentations during the recruitment process are the
183
most common and fruitful option for potential litigants. In certain
cases, such as when recruiters make “specific and isolated”
representations that are easily proven as false and material, such as
accreditation or licensing status, fraud litigation can be an effective
184
tool for redress.
Even the most ardent skeptics of the for-profit higher-education
industry, however, would concede that a great deal of negative
student outcomes do not implicate recruiting fraud. Getting a bad

182. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 86 (“[C]ompetition among non-profit institutions . . . has
fueled the creation of costly amenities . . . which may have little to do . . . with the quality of
education.”).
183. See Linehan, supra note 42, at 766 (explaining why fraudulent-misrepresentation suits
are “appealing weapons” in comparison to less frequently used litigation tools for addressing
negative student outcomes at for-profit schools).
184. Id.
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185

deal is problematic, but not unlawful. Nor should the courts be in
the business of investigating the wisdom of individual student debt
loads or choices to attend schools that are more expensive than
186
alternatives, particularly when so many burdensome debts would
not have been possible without federal intervention in the first
187
place.
That said, it is worth asking whether courts do, in fact, protect
against deceitful conduct. Misrepresentations go unpunished because
of the sheer number of variables that interact with a student on his or
188
her path from recruitment to default. This uncertainty undermines
189
virtually every prong of a plaintiff’s fraud case, from falsity to
190
191
192
scienter to reliance to causation. Fraud doctrine, therefore,
would appear to do very little to rein in schools’ recruiting behavior.
2. Shortcomings of Title IV Regulatory Devices. With so many
for-profit institutions reliant on Title IV as a revenue source, the
threat to revoke an institution’s eligibility to receive funds through
193
the program might seem excessively forceful.
However, the
regulatory regime has failed to prevent Title IV from facilitating
negative student outcomes. The strings attached to eligibility are too
weak to serve their intended purpose.
Regulating the cohort default rate might seem to be the
regulatory device most tailored to the problems at hand, because it
185. Cf. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7 (2011), vacated by Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v.
Duncan, No. 11-1314 (RC), 2012 WL 20505237 (D.D.C. June 30, 2012) (attempting to hold forprofit institutions accountable for negative student outcomes through the gainful employment
rule).
186. This view is reflected by the “academic abstention” doctrine, whereby courts generally
steer clear of qualitative judgments of educational institutions. Linehan, supra note 42, at 764–
65.
187. See S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., THE RETURN ON
THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT IN FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION: DEBT WITHOUT A DIPLOMA 11–12
(2010) (bemoaning the role federal dollars play in fueling burdensome debts).
188. See Linehan, supra note 42, at 768 (noting the impact of “student ability, labor demand,
[and] other factors outside the control of the school”).
189. See id. at 767 (“[F]orward-looking statements that rely on factors outside the school’s
control lack . . . the requisite degree of falsity . . . .”).
190. See Taylor, supra note 33, at 764 (“[P]roprietary schools are able to hide behind the fact
that much of what determines a graduate’s job prospects is outside of the school’s control.”).
191. See Linehan, supra note 42, at 768 (“[I]t is generally recognized that one does not have
the right to rely on statements that are predictive of the future.”).
192. See id. at 769 (noting “courts’ concern about their own inability to discern a causal link
between the student’s failure to learn and the school’s educational program”).
193. See supra Part III.A.1.
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directly measures student outcomes. A school loses eligibility to
receive Title IV funds if, for three consecutive years, more than 25
percent of its students default on certain federal student loans within
two years of the time when the students began repayment, or if
during any single year more than 40 percent of a student cohort
194
defaults. Most students are granted a six-month grace period after
graduation or withdrawal before making payments on their loans, and
it takes between 270 and 360 additional days of nonpayment before a
195
student is considered in default. Because of additional procedural
requirements, “[i]t takes about 600 days for a borrower to default on
196
a [Title IV] loan after the student ends attendance.” Additionally,
many students in financial trouble are eligible for payment
postponement measures, including deferrals based upon financial
197
hardship. A student who passes through the cohort window while in
deferment is not counted as having defaulted, even if the student
198
defaults immediately upon the expiration of the deferral.
With such a brief window within which a student could default
for the purposes of the cohort default rule, it is a wonder that any
schools ever fail this measure. It seems sensible to cap measures of
the cohort default rate after some time. As time passes, the school’s
effect on the student’s outcome is outweighed by a variety of
intervening factors. Too-stringent cohort default-rate calculations
would also discourage schools from admitting low-income students or
other students from populations associated with higher default rates.
However, two- or three-year rate calculations are far too narrow to
have any impact on preventing negative student outcomes when
199
defaults are so much higher over the lifetime of the loan. It even
appears that because the short measurements offer such little time for

194. 34 C.F.R. §§ 668.183, 668.187 (2012). For loans originating after 2009, the cohort
default rate is calculated with a three-year rather than a two-year window. Id. §§ 668.200–02.
195. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-OIG/A02H0007, FINAL AUDIT
REPORT: TECHNICAL CAREER INSTITUTES, INC.’S ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL PELL
GRANT AND FEDERAL FAMILY EDUCATION LOAN PROGRAMS 7 n.6 (2008), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2008/a02h0007.pdf.
196. Id. at 7.
197. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.204 (outlining procedures for financial hardship deferment).
198. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 244 (explaining deferment and forbearance exclusions to
the default rate calculation).
199. See S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?:
AN OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN
FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 10 (2010) (“[D]efault rates . . . do not fully capture students
who default. . . .”).
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students to default, many colleges can successfully delay default until
200
after the period ends. Ultimately, it is necessary to circumscribe the
cohort default calculation, excluding many defaults out of fairness to
the school, which highlights the limited utility of using cohort default
rates as a method of reducing negative student outcomes. Even the
Department of Education has conceded that the cohort default rate is
201
a better measure of loss to taxpayers than of harm to students.
The 90/10 rule is another major regulatory condition that is both
lenient and easily avoided. Unlike the cohort default rate regulations,
the 90/10 rule focuses on inputs rather than outputs. Because an
institution’s greater reliance on federal student aid is associated with
202
poorer student outcomes, the rule attempts to ensure that a school
offers an education of sufficient quality to attract funds independent
203
of those guaranteed by the federal government.
Stated simply, the 90/10 rule requires that a for-profit institution
receive more than 10 percent of its revenue from sources other than
204
Title IV student aid. Many sources of student aid can satisfy the 10
percent requirement, including veterans’ benefits or institutional
205
loans. Compelling justifications exist for excluding each of these
206
revenue sources from the 90-percent calculation. In the aggregate,
though, they allow schools to receive virtually all of their revenue
207
from government yet remain in compliance. This arrangement not
only undermines the 90/10 rule itself, because an institution that
obtains 93 percent of its revenue from the government, albeit
indirectly, through students’ tuition payments, has clearly not
200. See Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges, supra
note 76, at 9 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College Access and
Success) (“[C]olleges kept defaults down during, but not after, the period in which they were
being tracked . . . .”).
201. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,386, 34,411
(June 13, 2011) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668.7 (2011), vacated by Ass’n of Private Sector Colls.
& Univs. v. Duncan, No. 11-1314 (RC), 2012 WL 20505237 (D.D.C. June 30, 2012)).
202. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 163, at 3.
203. LOONIN, supra note 126, at 25.
204. 34 C.F.R. § 668.28 (2012).
205. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
206. For example, the Department of Education understandably would not want to make a
school choose between accepting the federal student aid for a low-income student receiving
Title IV funds and that of a combat veteran receiving veterans’ benefits.
207. See S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., THE RETURN ON
THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT IN FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION: DEBT WITHOUT A DIPLOMA 10
(2010) (observing that one for-profit institution received 93.1 percent of its revenue from the
federal government).
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obtained independence from government funding. But it threatens
the integrity of programs such as the veterans’ benefit programs that
may be used to satisfy the 10-percent requirement but that are,
208
nonetheless, federal funding. When a school’s revenue balance
begins to approach the 90-percent threshold, every dollar collected
from a 10-percent source becomes immensely valuable. One veterans’
benefits dollar allows a school to collect nine more Title IV dollars
that they otherwise would have been barred from receiving, thus
illuminating perhaps the best explanation for why veterans are so
209
heavily recruited by for-profit schools. These funding rules also
explain why many for-profit schools seem ambivalent about
outrageous write-off rates on their own institutional loans.
Institutional loans can be viewed as “loss leaders” because they allow
210
schools to expand their Title IV collection activities.
The cohort default rate and the 90/10 rules are the two federal
regulations that do the most work ensuring positive student outcomes
211
within the Title IV aid program. Other rules, such as the ban on
212
incentive payments for recruiters, are tailored more toward curbing
fraud than preventing students from receiving a bad deal. Similarly,
state oversight of for-profit schools tends not to address negative
outcomes enabled by the Title IV program, because states have
213
relatively little interest in the success or failure of Title IV. Finally,

208. See S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., BENEFITTING
WHOM? FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION COMPANIES AND THE GROWTH OF MILITARY
EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS 4 (2010) (“Congress may have unintentionally subjected this new
generation of veterans to the worst excesses of the for-profit industry . . . .”).
209. More than one-third of payments from the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-252, tit. V, 122 Stat. 2357 (2008) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 16132a, 16163a, 38 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3311–3324 (Supp. IV 2011)), went to students at for-profit
institutions in the program’s first year, Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at
For-Profit Colleges, supra note 76, at 13 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President,
Institute for College Access and Success).
210. See LOONIN, supra note 126, at 28 (noting one for-profit institution’s begrudging
acceptance of a loss of $75 million in private student loans).
211. See supra notes 50–55, 199–216 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
213. See Linehan, supra note 42, at 782 (“[T]he states have relatively little to lose from
student loan default resulting from proprietary schools’ predatory practices . . . .”); see also
Improving For-Profit Higher Education: A Roundtable Discussion of Policy Solutions: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of
Barmak Nassirian, Associate Executive Director, American Association of Collegiate
Registrars and Admissions Officers), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/Nassirian.pdf (“[S]tates have none of their own resources at risk, [and] they have no
particular . . . incentive to engage in meaningful oversight . . . .”).
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it is unclear what impact the Department of Education’s new gainful
214
employment rules would have had on reducing negative student
215
outcomes enabled by Title IV. An extra set of performance
standards could have provided students with welcome safeguards, but
many critics suggested that the final language of the regulations was
216
too weak to make a difference.
3. The Inherent Limits of Industry Sanctions. Higher education
217
has traditionally been a self-regulated field. Norms and tradition
inform many practices within the industry, including the dominance
218
of the nonprofit form. Accreditation served as a form of industry
self-regulation long before it was incorporated into the federal
219
regulatory structure.
Federal authority was first delegated to
220
accreditors in 1952, in an amendment to the G.I. Bill.
Within the regulatory triad, questions about the efficacy and
value of academic programs or institutions are left to professional
221
educators. Given federal and state governments’ great reluctance to
qualitatively evaluate academic institutions, accreditation would seem
an appropriate venue for ensuring positive student outcomes. In
theory, Title IV access is only awarded to institutions that have been
judged by experts and peers to deliver a satisfactory educational

214. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7 (2011), vacated by Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan,
681 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2012). As noted supra note 59, it is possible that upon remand or
through further rulemaking, the Department of Education reinstates the substance of the
gainful employment rules.
215. See Michael Stratford, 193 Vocational Programs, All at For-Profits, Fail ‘Gainful
Employment’ Test, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 6, 2012, at A14 (noting that when the
Department of Education assessed for-profit institutions’ compliance with the gainful
employment rules before the rules were to go into effect, about 5 percent of programs at forprofit institutions would have been rendered ineligible for federal student aid).
216. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 261 (characterizing the rule as “a case of shockingly
low expectations”). Perhaps more important is the dilemma outlined infra Part IV.C. If the rule
had been truly successful at preventing poor outcomes, it would almost certainly have done so
by sacrificing access to higher education, thereby limiting the positive impacts of Title IV.
217. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
218. See Pusser, supra note 13, at 24 (noting the peculiarity of an industry dominated by
nonprofit institutions); see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
219. KINSER, supra note 22, at 100.
220. Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, ch. 875, pt. VI, § 253(a)(1), 66 Stat.
663, 675, replaced by Veterans’ Benefits, Pub. L. No. 85-857, 72 Stat. 1105 (1958) (codified as
amended at 38 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
221. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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product. In practice, higher academic self-regulation fails to offer
the scrutiny that would be required to prevent negative student
outcomes at any significant level.
Accreditation fails to give for-profit institutions a sufficiently
close look for three reasons. First, national accrediting agencies
223
provide the requisite approval for most for-profit schools. These
agencies are more diffuse and have fewer resources than the six main
regional accreditors, and their standards are generally considered
224
lower because they operate on a smaller scale,
providing
225
accreditation to career-oriented programs rather than institutions.
Accreditors with less administrative capability often appear to
226
For an
operate under a presumption to grant accreditation.
227
institution that treats accreditation as merely a business objective,
these national accrediting organizations are very appealing.
Second, regional accrediting organizations are known for more
228
stringent standards, but they have found it difficult to assess forprofit institutions that disregard the norms of traditional higher
229
230
education. For-profit institutions are industry rogues. They treat
faculty as contractors, removing them from the administrative process
231
and curriculum development. They treat education as a commodity
232
with little inherent value. They standardize curricula and ignore the
222. See Bridgepoint Education, Inc.: A Case Study in For-Profit Higher Education: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of
Sylvia Manning, President, Higher Learning Commission, North Central Association of
Colleges and Schools), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Manning.pdf (“[T]o
assess academic quality at the level of higher education, you need the authority of professional
experience and current knowledge.”).
223. KINSER, supra note 22, at 106.
224. See Improving For-Profit Higher Education: A Roundtable Discussion of Policy
Solutions, supra note 213, at 2 (statement of Barmak Nassirian, Associate Executive Director,
American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers) (explaining the
practical difficulties in enforcing high standards for accreditors lacking in resources).
225. KINSER, supra note 22, at 98.
226. See id. at 3 (“Accrediting bodies have strong financial, political, and legal incentives to
approve even the most questionable applicants.”).
227. RUCH, supra note 78, at 141.
228. See, e.g., KINSER, supra note 22, at 99 (“[R]egional accreditation has been traditionally
perceived as an indication of quality and status.” (citation omitted)).
229. Id. at 108–110.
230. See BERG, supra note 17, at 93–106 (describing “for-profit university culture”).
231. See, e.g., Breneman, supra note 61, at 85–86 (detailing this phenomenon at the
University of Phoenix).
232. Cf. RUCH, supra note 63, at 18 (“The generation, dissemination, and advancement of
knowledge are core values that are . . . more or less woven into the mission statement of
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233

traditional academic calendar. They install “campuses” in office
parks around the country rather than in one single location, or in the
234
case of some online schools, they have no campuses at all. They
have fundamentally different goals than traditional higher-education
235
institutions, being neither philanthropic nor prestige-seeking.
Having moved past a time when for-profit institutions were
236
categorically excluded from regional accrediting status, accreditors
have largely responded to the paradigm-shifting nature of for-profit
institutions by holding fast to formalist requirements, such as
237
mandating installation of hard-copy libraries. Regional accreditors
also struggle with evaluating institutions based in their region but
238
with fundamentally national operations.
Third, the accreditation process is vulnerable to capture, due to
the fact that the enormously valuable Title IV funds are only
239
available to accredited institutions. For-profit institutions have
purchased entire colleges to piggyback on the college’s accreditation,
dramatically expanding the old school’s “existing” programs rather
than starting from scratch and going through the accreditation
240
process. With so much at stake, considerable pressure is exerted
upon accrediting agencies, which are financially dependent on their
institutional members and whose officers are largely drawn from the

virtually every respectable, traditional academic institution. Even for-profit providers do not
totally ignore these values, for they are more or less built into accreditation and state licensing
standards.”).
233. Many for-profit institutions eschew the semester format for a schedule in which
students take one intensive five-week course at a time. E.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra
note 57, at 1.
234. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 44 (describing a typical campus of Strayer University).
235. See id. at 16 (“The non-profits are driven by . . . the prestige motive, as opposed to the
profit motive on the for-profit side.”).
236. KINSER, supra note 22, at 102–03.
237. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 41 (confessing that most of DeVry University’s library
investments were only made because of accreditation directives).
238. KINSER, supra note 22, at 108–10.
239. See Improving For-Profit Education: A Roundtable Discussion of Policy Solutions,
supra note 213, at 2 (statement of Barmak Nassirian, Associate Executive Director, American
Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers) (“[A]ccreditation is dominated
by the very entities that it is supposed to oversee.”).
240. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FORPROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 2–3 (2010). Accreditors have begun to crack down on this
behavior. Bridgepoint Education, Inc.: A Case Study in For-Profit Higher Education, supra note
222, at 3 (statement of Sylvia Manning, President, Higher Learning Commission, North Central
Association of Colleges and Schools).
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institutions they oversee. Further, accreditors themselves continue
to insist that their role is to evaluate educational institutions as
242
educators, not to uphold the integrity of the Title IV system.
IV. SOLVING TITLE IV: A CONTINUUM OF APPROACHES
If Title IV encourages the negative outcomes suffered by many
students at for-profit schools, what can be done? This Part examines a
variety of broad approaches to reducing negative student outcomes.
These approaches differ based on their hostility toward the for-profit
higher-education sector in an attempt to reduce negative student
outcomes at those institutions. Ultimately, however, it is difficult to
envision an approach working within Title IV that solves the
problems posed by negative student outcomes at for-profit
institutions to a satisfactory degree while still advancing the HEA’s
worthwhile goals.
A. Eliminate Federal Student Aid Eligibility of For-Profit Institutions
Participation by the for-profit sector in the Title IV student-aid
program is certainly not a given; it took for-profit institutions seven
243
years to be allowed into the program. To combat negative outcomes
associated with the for-profit sector, then, singling out the for-profit
sector for the purposes of Title IV might seem to be a logical
approach for policymakers. This approach could take many forms:
Congress could simply return to the 1965 formulation of Title IV in
244
which the for-profit sector is categorically excluded, or Congress or
the Department of Education could implement onerous measures
singling out for-profit institutions for special treatment to exclude the
industry de facto.
The argument for such an approach is straightforward. There are
significant differences between for-profit institutions and the rest of
245
the higher-education industry. Some commentators argue that the
profit motive is totally or to a large degree incompatible with the
HEA’s desire to increase the creation of a public good, particularly

241. Improving For-Profit Education: A Roundtable Discussion of Policy Solutions, supra
note 213, at 2 (statement of Barmak Nassirian, Associate Executive Director, American
Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers).
242. ABUSES IN FEDERAL STUDENT AID PROGRAMS, S. REP. NO. 102-58, at 17–18 (1991).
243. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 230–235 and accompanying text.
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when such a thriving nonprofit cohort—with philanthropic goals
generally aligned with those outlined in the HEA—already dominates
246
the field. Indeed, extinguishing the private, for-profit sector would
result in a higher-education industry that more resembles its
traditional state, in which for-profit institutions played a much smaller
247
role.
Plus, for-profit institutions are already singled out for special
treatment under Title IV. As noted earlier, they were excluded
248
entirely under the original version of the HEA. Many of the Title
IV regulations apply to the for-profit sector only, such as the “gainful
employment” language in the 1972 amendments, their accompanying
249
rulemaking, and the 90/10 rule. Even nonprofit career colleges,
which use ostensibly the same employment-focused educational
approach as many for-profit institutions, are not legally required to
prepare students for “gainful employment in a recognized
250
occupation” in the way for-profit institutions are.
This categorical approach, however, is shortsighted—in addition
251
to being a political non-starter. For-profit institutions surely create
some social good. They offer education to populations that remain
252
underserved
by
traditional
higher-education
institutions,
particularly as public funding for public universities and community
253
colleges continues to plummet. Further, because of the sheer
number of schools within the industry and their great heterogeneity,
there must be a large coterie of schools that does not contribute
disproportionally to negative student outcomes. To the extent they
246. See S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?:
AN OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN
FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 1 (2010) (“[E]ach corporation must act in the interest of its
shareholders. However, this imperative could conflict with the objective of Federal student aid
programs . . . .”).
247. See, e.g., KINSER, supra note 22, at 23 (“Unlike [in] some earlier periods . . . there
seems to be little doubt of the for-profit sector’s survival.”).
248. See supra note 23.
249. See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (drawing a distinction between
traditional higher-education institutions and for-profit institutions); see also 34 C.F.R.
§668.28(a)(1) (2012) (applying the 90/10 rule only to for-profit institutions).
251. See Sam Dillon, Online Colleges Receive a Boost from Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2006, at A1 (“[For-profits] have a full-blown lobbying effort and give lots of money to
campaigns. In 10 years, the power of this interest group has spiked as much as any you’ll find.”
(quoting Rep. Michael N. Castle) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
252. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 88.
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could be categorized as such, and this Note does not attempt to do so,
excluding these “good” for-profit schools would only hurt students by
reducing access without a corresponding reduction in negative
outcomes. It is not even clear that the for-profit motive is actually
incongruous with Title IV. After all, the HEA seeks to expand access
to education to the broadest extent, particularly with regard to the
very low-income, minority, or nontraditional students served
254
disproportionately by for-profit institutions.
For its boldness, such an approach would also be an
underinclusive attempt to reduce negative student outcomes in higher
education. Though students from for-profit institutions are
responsible for a disproportionate number of Title IV loan defaults,
for example, those students still represent less than half of the total
255
number of overall defaults. The lack of a profit motive has not
stopped nonprofit institutions from steadily and dramatically
256
increasing their own tuition prices over the last few decades. What
nonprofit institutions forego in profit they appear to make up for in
257
inefficiency, often at the student’s expense. Nonprofit institutions
also must deal with their own issues of institutional priorities and
often find themselves working to increase their own prestige through
258
measures unrelated to academic value.
B. Reduce Access to Federal Student Aid
The approach at the other end of the spectrum treats for-profit
and nonprofit institutions equally. If Title IV is truly fueling the
negative student outcomes caused by for-profit schools, but if
categorically excluding for-profit schools from the program is unwise
or unpalatable, then it is Title IV itself that requires a second look.
Under this approach, Congress could seek to reduce Title IV’s
capability to fuel negative student outcomes by reducing the federal
investment in expanding access to education. This could be done by
decreasing the amount of credit offered through the program or by
implementing stronger gatekeeping measures to assess student

254. See supra notes 3–4, 8, 76–78 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
257. See RUCH, supra note 78, at 93 (positing that administrators at nonprofit institutions
have “little or no financial incentive to increase operating efficiency . . . [and are] confronted
with a significant disincentive to generate savings”).
258. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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creditworthiness before allowing them to borrow or otherwise receive
aid.
If too much student access to credit were the problem, this
approach solves it. At some point, credit offered for an education—
and by extension, the educational opportunity the credit unlocks—
simply may not put students in a position to succeed. No education at
all might be better than a poor or incomplete one fueled by excessive
debt. If a student is unable to extract sufficient value from the point
of their enrollment forward, it serves neither the student nor society
to allow that student to borrow against his or her own future. Some
might argue that it is simply naïve to assume that all students are an
appropriate fit for higher education, and that the current level of
access to federal aid merely creates a market for subprime
259
education.
Though this Note does suggest that the Title IV program lies at
260
the heart of many negative student outcomes, the cure offered by
this approach is worse than the disease. First, erecting barriers of
creditworthiness to Title IV aid would result in a dramatic reduction
in aid for the neediest students. A relatively small deemphasis on
grant- and loan-based aid in favor of deductible tax credits has
already had the effect of reducing access for the poor in favor of
261
greater affordability to the middle class. The same effect can be
262
observed when need-based aid becomes merit-based. Conditioning
Title IV aid on creditworthiness—assessed via measures of prior
academic performance, or even a student’s assets—will almost
certainly have the same effect.
An across-the-board reduction in availability of grant- or loanbased aid will result in great reductions in access to higher education,
resulting in otherwise-worthy students missing out on the opportunity
for an education. Reducing aid to students would also lead to worse
outcomes for those students who are not deterred from pursuing an
education despite the reduced level of aid. Private loans, after all, are
available and sometimes necessary for students even under the
current system, and their higher interest rates and lack of favorable

259. For an extensive comparison between the subprime mortgage market and the student
loan “push market,” see LOONIN, supra note 140, at 33–43.
260. See supra Part III.A.2.
261. JAMES B. STEDMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB10097, THE HIGHER EDUCATION
ACT: REAUTHORIZATION STATUS AND ISSUES 7 (2004).
262. Pusser, supra note 13, at 28.
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federal-aid protections cause greater pain than Title IV loans if the
263
student’s investment proves to be unwise.
This approach would represent an abandonment of the principles
that underlie the HEA. Reducing access to credit, without some
countervailing means of support, may indeed protect the public and
save some students from themselves, but it would come at a
significant cost: closing the “door to knowledge” for many
Americans, including significant populations of low-income, minority,
264
and nontraditional students.
C. Strengthen the Title IV Regulatory Regime
The inadequacy of the regulatory regime responsible for guiding
Title IV presents an opportunity to solve the problems associated
with for-profit institutions and Title IV without sacrificing the goals of
265
the program or categorically excluding the for-profit sector.
Expanding the time period for cohort default rates and taking steps to
include students in deferment and forbearance would keep many
266
schools more cognizant of student financial outcomes. Reducing the
90/10 ratio or eliminating some of its exceptions would diminish the
concern that high levels of institutional dependency on federal aid
267
lead to worse student outcomes.
Strengthening borrower
protections on student loans could mitigate the effects of an
268
educational investment gone sour.
The new gainful-employment rules were the Department of
Education’s most ambitious attempt to curb negative student
outcomes at for-profit schools. Drawing from statutory language that
269
had little effect for decades, the rules acknowledged the inadequacy
270
of the previous Title IV framework. The rules addressed many of
the practices responsible for negative student outcomes: disclosure of

263. See LOONIN, supra note 140, at 12, 18 (outlining the key differences between federal
and private students loans and discussing the reasons why students turn to private loans).
264. Cf. Johnson, supra note 4 (emphasizing the government’s goal of expanding access to
higher education).
265. See supra Part III.B.
266. See supra notes 194–201 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 202–210 and accompanying text.
268. Cf. supra note 140.
269. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
270. See Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,386,
34,454 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.7 (2011), vacated by Ass’n of Private Sector
Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, No. 11-1314 (RC), 2012 WL 20505237 (D.D.C. June 30, 2012)).
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key performance information would have helped students evaluate
institutions that recruit them, and the job-placement and debtrepayment measures would have, at least to some degree, tied a
271
school’s financial future to the well-being of its students. The rule’s
original draft was even more potent, with less-forgiving standards
placed upon schools and a “tiered” system of Title IV eligibility that
would have allowed the government to restrict aid received by
272
schools that underperform clearly, but not flagrantly.
The gainful-employment rule represented a positive sign to many
commentators who have clamored for a regulatory approach aimed
directly at reducing negative student outcomes in the for-profit
273
sector. The history of Title IV regulation shows that measures such
as this can indeed have some impact. After the implementation of the
cohort default rate and the 90/10 rules in the early 1990s, many of the
worst-offending schools were driven out of business and student
274
defaults declined.
But these regulatory tweaks—including even the strongest
iteration of the gainful employment rule—do not and cannot address
the structural issues inherent within the Title IV program.
Regulations that would significantly decrease negative student
outcomes enabled by Title IV, such as an iteration of the 90/10 rule
under which a school could only derive 45 percent of its revenues
275
from Title IV, would likely have the effect of reducing access.
Regulations that seek to curb negative outcomes without conceding
any student access will resemble the current cohort default rate and
276
90/10 rules: easy to game for a minimally sophisticated actor. It is a
worthy endeavor to increase the likelihood a career-oriented school
prepares its students for gainful employment, but these measures
cannot themselves resolve the Title IV tug-of-war between stopping

271. See id. at 34,456 (noting a “failure to align institutional incentives with student success”
and enacting rules that “ensure that institutions consider the affordability of [their students’]
loans”).
272. Id. at 34,388.
273. See, e.g., Fawn Johnson, Gainful Employment Rule: What Do We Think?, NAT’L J.
EDUC. EXPERTS BLOG (June 6, 2011, 9:10 AM), http://education.nationaljournal.com/2011/06/
gainfulemployment-rule-what-do.php (“[T]he gainful-employment rule opens new possibilities
for regulation . . . .”).
274. KINSER, supra note 22, at 118; see also supra note 215.
275. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 163, at 9–10 (suggesting a higher
threshold but noting that such a revised rule would decrease access).
276. See supra Part III.B.2.
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the law from enabling negative student outcomes and cutting off
access.
D. The Public-Supply Model: A Way Around the Inherent Tensions
of Title IV
Is the answer, then, that the negative outcomes that arise from
for-profit colleges are simply a tradeoff inherent within Title IV’s
objective of expanding access to higher education? Thankfully, the
answer is no. This tension is unavoidable within the portable-subsidy
student-aid model that Title IV establishes as the federal
government’s primary method of expanding access to higher
education. The public-supply model, however, offers an alternative.
To summarize, Title IV seeks to expand access to higher
education by using the portable-subsidy model, which offers grants
277
and favorable loans to defray a student’s cost of attendance. By
contrast, the public-supply model expands access to higher education
through direct investments in public institutions with the goal of
reducing tuition prices. The public-supply model traditionally has
278
involved states investing in their own public institutions. As state
funding for institutions declines, however, federal student aid through
Title IV assumes an increasingly prominent role in the quest to
279
expand educational access.
An approach based on refocusing the federal government’s
student-aid policy on public support instead of student subsidies
satisfies many of the objections to the three rejected approaches
above. Categorically excluding for-profit universities from Title IV is
a poor solution because it will sharply reduce access to career280
oriented higher education. It also unfairly shuts down those forprofit institutions that do not disproportionately contribute to
negative student outcomes while leaving untouched a much larger
industry group—nonprofit institutions—which still produce negative
281
student outcomes in great numbers. However, by deemphasizing
Title IV funding in favor of tuition reductions at community colleges

277. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
278. See Pusser, supra note 18, at 38–39 (noting increases in educational costs following a
gradual policy shift away from a public-support model); see also Dill, supra note 36, at 142
(discussing how the market for higher education can increase the cost of education).
279. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
280. See supra Part IV.A.
281. See supra Part IV.A.
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and state universities, the public-supply approach would diminish the
role of for-profit institutions without decreasing overall access to
higher education and without categorically excluding the for-profit
sector.
Blunting the impact of Title IV by making credit less available to
282
students would be similarly misguided. Instead, the government
could lessen the need to extend to students large amounts of credit by
283
reducing the price of education through public support. When the
price of education is lower, students and taxpayers are harmed less
when an educational investment does not succeed, yet student access
284
remains undiminished. Finally, an emphasis on public support for
education allows the government far greater oversight of educational
285
inputs and outputs than even the most intricate regulatory regime.
Of course, public support of higher education is by no means a
panacea for all that ails higher education. This approach sacrifices a
great degree of consumer choice in the marketplace for higher
286
education. As current state funding levels demonstrate, a further
emphasis on public support would leave many students at the mercy
of the budgetary process, whereas Title IV aid—particularly the
guaranteed loan program—is, for better or for worse, quite
287
dependable. Although shifting from Title IV’s portable-subsidy
approach to the public-support approach would require consideration
of many more interests than are addressed in this Note, such a
strategic shift would directly address the particular problems posed by
for-profit colleges’ relationship with Title IV. The public-support
model relieves federal student aid’s essential tension by striving to
reduce poor student outcomes and fostering the increased levels of
access to education promoted by Title IV. It does this all without
singling out for-profit institutions within the higher-education
marketplace.

282. See supra Part IV.B.
283. For an explanation of how this approach lowers costs, see supra notes 180–182 and
accompanying text.
284. Contrast this approach with today’s “high-price, high-aid” model, as described in
Glater, supra note 20, at 41–42.
285. See Pusser, supra note 13, at 35 (“[W]here education is provided in public institutions
with public funds, the public has the greatest influence over the institution and its activities.”).
286. See id. at 36 (noting the value of consumer choice in higher education).
287. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

For many prospective college students, Title IV federal student
aid is the gateway to a better future. Without it, obtaining a valuable
education would not be possible. But for many former students of forprofit institutions, Title IV has been nothing but the enabler of an
oppressive financial situation. Indeed, the incredible success of many
for-profit institutions has exposed the essential tension within Title
IV. The program seeks to better individuals and society by expanding
access to higher education, but by facilitating that access, the program
often leaves students worse off. As long as Title IV pursues its goals
by enabling students as market actors with portable subsidies and
easy access to credit, this tension will remain. Efforts to rein in
negative student outcomes will result in a reduction in access for the
students who need it most.
The solution to this dilemma, then, is to shift from Title IV’s
student-oriented aid model and reemphasize public supply of higher
education, characterized by direct investment in institutions to lower
the cost of education and lessen students’ need for aid. Obviously,
this policy shift requires consideration of many more factors than
discussed in this Note. But if curing negative student outcomes caused
by for-profit institutions without reducing access to education were
policymakers’ supreme concern, this approach would indeed address
it effectively and fairly.

